Glossary Terms

 

WISSENCHAFTSLEHRE AND CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY – In the sense of the contributions of Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) to classical German philosophy and concerning the hermeneutic issues relevant to the historical-philosophical reconstruction of his thought for current research. On classical German philosophy, beyond the most immediate borders of the Germanic language, it is not recurrent to find studies on Schleiermacher. On the contrary, with regard to the expectations that are generated by the subject, mentions of his philosophical contribution appear, at most, in a marginal way, or with the aim of nudging intellectual polemics of the period: for example, in order to elucidate the criticisms of Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) directed against romanticism and the theology of feeling. About Schleiermacher and German classical philosophy, we can say that, from a distanced and generic view, the expressions German classical philosophy and German idealism are interchangeable, whose famous formula from Kant to Hegel ended up establishing itself as a period in the history of philosophy. However, as we approach these concepts and their historical genesis, we are faced with difficulties regarding the precise clarification of the qualifiers classic and idealism. For they may well refer to a more or less comprehensive “concept of the epoch”, as they may also refer to a “material concept” that concerns only a certain current of thought within a specific philosophical period. In the latter case, the greater its material determination, the greater the exclusion of certain authors, even if located within the same historical contour. For this reason, the concept of idealism tends to be more problematic: on the one hand, it is applicable only to a fraction of philosophers and, therefore, inappropriate as a concept of the epoch; on the other hand, it was a late neo-Kantian product, which did not even correspond to the philosophical program of its main protagonists, since they all proposed to overcome the alternatives between idealism and realism. Be that as it may, if we understand classical German philosophy as a concept of the time – less problematic than the concept of idealism –, it is not immune to the arbitrariness of temporal cuts and school prejudices. The expression itself goes back to the pamphlet by Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (1888). As Erst-Otto Onnasch pointed out, classic here means the period between Kant (1724-1804) and Feuerbach (1804-1872) – in such a way that Feuerbachian materialism would consist in the critical overcoming of Hegelian philosophy and, therefore, a previous stage of socialism. scientific. Onnasch highlights two fundamental problems of such a conception: firstly, we do not have here a neutral concept, with regard to German history and philosophy, but an evaluative one, and that bourgeois and liberal philosophy, such as, for example, the Romantics, does not belong to this heritage; in addition, the historical and philosophical linearity is explicitly defended here, starting from Kant and reaching its consummation with Hegel and Feuerbach. In order to overcome these aforementioned limitations, as well as to be valid as an epochal concept in the history of philosophy, Walter Jaeschke argues in favor of the terminology classical German philosophy, understanding it, however, as a unit of thought that “is not found agreement in principle among philosophers, but in the complex connection between agreement and disagreement. In this way, this new understanding distances itself from the perspective of Engels, for whom Schleiermacher has no place among the classics, although he is an exponent of romanticism and bourgeois philosophy. Furthermore, this new orientation not only recovers important authors of the period, who were often marginalized, but also broadens the interpretative horizon that tended to crystallize them in intermediate stages of the dialectical development that would culminate in Hegel. Mainly from the seminal studies on idealism by Dieter Henrich, from the 1970s onwards, research on classical German philosophy abandoned a predominantly logical-dialectical scheme, with Hegel at its peak.

And, increasingly investigating the philosophical productions of Kant and Hegel and reassessing such productions as their own contributions and with multivariate directions. Therefore, we can trace lines of continuities and discontinuities between different authors, who each time forged their own and even irreducible solutions, since what is taken into account is a constellation of discussions and shared problems. Indeed, from the moment that Schleiermacher is revitalized, more than ever we must question the systematic meaning of his claim as a classical philosopher, that is, we must clarify his systematic position within the period of classical German philosophy. It is not new that influential historians of philosophy have focused on the intense intellectual movement produced in Germany at the end of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century. From a historical and systematic point of view, in the first half of the 20th century, the work Von Kant bis Hegel by Richard Kroner stood out, published in two volumes, respectively, in 1921 and 1924. For this author, essentially, the development of German idealism would begin with the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781), and its end – not only chronological but also eschatological – with the publication of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1821). In the second volume of this work, in the context of the passage from the philosophy of nature to the philosophy of spirit, Kroner dedicates a brief section to Schleiermacher as a modality of aesthetic idealism, based on the romantic writing of 1799, Über die Religion. However, the problem with this interpretation is due to the circumscription of Schleiermacherian philosophy to the first romanticism (Früromantik), which is why it relies only on the writing published during his collaboration in the romantic circle. But this literary source is not only insufficient to extract all the philosophical content of his thought, but also inappropriate, given that it was a writing, strictly speaking, of philosophical theology. In turn, in his work Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, also published in two volumes (1923, 1929), Nicolai Hartmann follows Kant's motto to Kroner's Hegel, but stresses the fact that, regardless of the differences in the various tendencies, two poles worked together, Kantian philosophy and the commitment to a system of philosophy. In this work, Schleiermacher received a fairer evaluation, as Hartmann takes into account not only his philosophy of religion, but also his conception of dialectics and ethics. From a systematic point of view, our author is presented again as a romantic, although he differs from F. Schlegel (1772-1829) and Novalis (1772-1801), as the latter did not intend to elaborate a system, even if unfinished and open. However, in Hartmann's view, Schleiermacher was once again weighed down by the fact that he was a theologian rather than a philosopher, in such a way that his philosophy consisted, above all, in the philosophy of religion. This being so, dialectics and ethics were interpreted in the light of the background religious concept, as it would be the center of their philosophical intuitions. An assessment that is not only unfair – judging by the distinction that Schleiermacher himself seeks to achieve, within his system, between the tasks of philosophy and theology; but in addition, it seems to us to be a one-sided criticism, since we see no impediment to generalizing it also to Schelling's or Hegel's programs, and that is to say the least. The most recent manual on the history of philosophy to pursue our author's philosophical development consists of the four-handed work by Walter Jaeschke and Andreas Arndt, Die Klassische Deutsche Philosophie nach Kant (2012).

The authors describe post-Kantian philosophy as the period between the years 1785 and 1845, which extends, from a political point of view, from the years immediately before and after the French Revolution until the end of the Vormärz. As main characteristics, they highlight Kant's transcendental philosophy and the rise of Spinozism in Germany, the latter responsible for the controversies involving disputes over pantheism, atheism and theism. From a systematic point of view, Schleiermacher is placed, once again, within the scope of the Früromantik movement and its transformations, in a similar way to the treatment given by N. Hartmann, although without the more rigid schema of the unfolding that would lead to Hegel, leaving space for , for example, for the late work of Fichte and Schelling. According to Jaeschke and Arndt, the decision on Schleiermacher's place in the development of classical German philosophy would depend on the answer to the question proposed by Michael Theunissen (1992), namely: whether Schleiermacher forwarded, within idealism, a post-idealist thinking, or if he can be seen as one of its protagonists who provided a systematic form for the philosophy of romanticism. The authors defended the second alternative, since Schleiermacher effectively proposes a system. But, along with the Romantics, it would be an unfinished system permanently in becoming: a work in progress, whose foundation and end would not themselves be objects of knowledge. In fact, in our view, the aspect that remains objectionable is that it fundamentally attributes Schleiermacherian philosophy to the early Romantic movement at the turn of the 18th century to the 19th century (1797 to 1802). Even more so if we consider his intellectual activity after 1802, especially in the years of teaching in Berlin from 1810, when he effectively developed his systematic understanding of philosophy. Now, understanding him as a philosopher of the first romanticism tends to minimize his intellectual maturation in the later work. In order to deepen this debate, we will seek to expose, below, part of this late development. In the University Lectures on Dialectics (1811-1831), when Schleiermacher was teaching theology at the then University of Berlin since the year of its foundation, in autumn 1810, but as a member of the Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, It was allowed to teach at the philosophy faculty. Dialektik was the label that gathered the collection of these philosophical lectures given during the period from 1811 to 183111. It is a collection of manuscripts, some well structured and basically complete, others quite fragmented. The incomplete character of the writings and their different transmission sources made it difficult to establish a standard text, not to mention that they presupposed, in practice, oral explanations. Yet, despite the exegetical obstacles of an unfinished work, we can derive its formal structure and main theses from it. The initial thread that allows us to access these writings lies in understanding the task and purpose of these lectures. Schleiermacher's Dialectics courses served as prolegomena for his philosophy, also signaling the systematic effort to formulate and execute his philosophical program. In fact, the lectures were supposed to counterbalance the influence of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) – then professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin – so they proposed themselves as an alternative solution to the Wissenschaftslehre. Schleiermacher’s purpose in presenting his own Doctrine of Science can be confirmed, for example, in a writing on ethics from the year 1803, Kritik der Sittenlehre, where he uses Fichtean terminology as a “science of the foundations and systematic nexus of all Science".

In short, it would be a general theory of knowledge that implies, at the same time, a transcendental discussion of the ultimate foundation of knowledge; but, unlike Fichte, it could not be deduced purely a priori, that is, independently of the real sciences. However, the term Doctrine of Science is replaced by the category Dialectics from 1810/12 onwards. We do not know for sure the decisive moment when Schleiermacher chose to change the title of the discipline, but in Brouillon zur Ethik (1805/06) he alludes to Plato and defines διαλέγεσθαι as the organ of philosophy, responsible for conducting dialogue in the field of know. There are two plausible clues to understand this change. The first has to do with the project of translating Plato's complete work, which began in 1804, and which led him to deepen his studies of Plato's work. In this particular, the link with F. Schlegel is a factor to be considered, not to mention the fact that he had already developed a positive understanding of dialectics. A. Arndt defends the thesis that, for Schleiermacher, but also for Schelling, the contact with Friedrich Schlegel was fundamental, who already had from a very early age – at least since 1796, a positive understanding of dialectics as authentic art – contrary to the conception Kant's denial of dialectics as appearance. The second clue is in the closer contact with the philosophy of Schelling from 1804 onwards, an author who developed a positive understanding of the dialectical art in the Lectures on the Method of Academic Study (1803) - although it is not possible to fully prove the conscious admission of Schleiermacher of this Schellingian concept. Furthermore, we must emphasize that there is no indication, either textual or biographical, that Hegel, with the publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), exerted an influence on Schleiermacher's terminological conception. After all, the latter would only have acquired this Hegelian writing from 1816, together with the Science of Logic (1812/13/16); whereas, Differences between Fichte's and Schelling's Philosophical Systems (1801), which Schleiermacher probably knew, makes no use of dialectical terminology. Therefore, in summary, we can state the following: from 1810 onwards, there was, effectively, a convergence between the project of a Doctrine of Science (1803) – a term then abandoned – and a positive understanding of διαλέγεσθαι (1805/06), in such a way that so that their unification was materialized in the lectures on Dialectics. The gradual conquest of the concept of dialectics corresponded to the own effort of according to a letter from Schleiermacher sent to Joachim Christian Gass (1766-1831), in which he recounts his attempt to expose a discipline entitled Dialectics, and that this idea he had been carrying with him for some time, although it does not report since when. On Philosophy as the art of dialogue, Dialectics consists of an investigation that contains the “principles of the art of philosophizing”, or the “art of conducting a dialogue”, or even, the “principles for conducting dialogue, in accordance with the art of , in the realm of pure thinking”, according to the definitions provided, respectively, in the manuscripts of 1814/15 and 1822, as well as in the Final Version of the Introduction of 1833. The understanding of philosophy as dialectics was intended to correct the speculative impulses of its authors contemporaries who intended to claim, for first philosophy, an unconditional starting point, or even a Science of the Absolute - a lesson that our author thought he had learned from Plato, as attested by a passage from the Notebook of 1811: "What Plato says of the άγαθόν (...) this goes for the Absolute. Science and truth are not the Absolute, but come from it.” In other words, for our author, the concept of the Absolute, also known as a transcendental foundation, behaves as a limiting concept with regard to the ultimate foundation of knowledge. But it is not an object of knowledge or science.

In this particular, Schleiermacher understands himself as an heir of Kant and of the Transzendental-Philosophie, however, he rejects the speculative thinking, for example, of Fichte and Schelling, considering them to be the result of the superposition of the philosophical principle and the Christian principle – or that is, the claim of a Science of the Absolute would have historical motivation, in virtue of the Christian religious experience. In short, Dialectics is opposed to any philosophical current that, in one way or another, blurs the boundaries between philosophical knowledge and the religious dimension. To understand his proposal, we must focus, especially, on the concepts of pure thinking and conducting dialogue. In its broadest sense, the act of thinking is understood as a spiritual function, that is, as a capacity for representation; in its strictest sense, thought is any representation expressed through language. Schleiermacher distinguishes three types of acts of thought: practical thinking (geschäftlich), artistic thinking (künstlerisch) and pure thinking (rein). The first is related to action, characterized by the elements of self-determination and purpose, of man's dominion over nature and over other men. The second type consists of momentary acts of thought, linked to internal perceptions and sensations, free from an immediate practical purpose. The third type of thinking is similar to the second type, but it addresses itself especially to the sphere of knowledge and science, therefore, it has claims to universality. This being so, practical thinking works for an external purpose, while pure and artistic thinking have in common the fact that they act for the sake of thinking itself. Thus, artistic thinking and pure thinking have a self-referential character due to the fact that it is an act of thinking that relates to its own thinking activity. As a result, we can assign them a specific modality of dialogue. Artistic thinking would consist of a type of free dialogue; while pure thinking would be responsible for conducting dialogue (Gesprächführung). Therefore, conducting dialogue, according to Schleiermacher, does not mean a conversation between peers, but concerns the dialogue of a thinking being with himself, strictly speaking, a monologue (Selbstgespräch) of the spirit. Furthermore, as has been said, all thinking also implies language. For this reason, according to Schleiermacher, the monologue always takes place within a linguistic circle (Sprachkreiss). The intrinsic correlation between thought and language was first established in Brouillon zur Ethik (1805-06), when it was emphasized that dialogue (διαλέγεσθαι), which aims at an identical (universal) knowledge, is only communicated through individuality or particularity. of discourse (Reden). This means that the universal dimension of knowledge is conditioned by the individual and historical determinations of the linguistic circle, in such a way that knowledge never reaches an absolute universalization. However, one must take care of the mistake of understanding the conduct of dialogue as a dialogic communication or process of understanding discourses. Indeed, language belongs to the sphere of communication of results, but it is not sufficient to explain the basis of its own production. Once the concepts of conducting dialogue and pure thinking are clarified, we can move on to the determination of philosophy as the art of dialogue. The fundamental philosophical task, for Schleiermacher, consists in the search for an identical, universal knowledge, in order to overcome the differences in the representations of thought that, effectively, are historically and linguistically updated.

However, identical knowledge remains, always and each time, provisional and subject to improvement, since it cannot suppress, once and for all, the linguistic-cultural particularities. In the domain of knowledge, the search for an identical knowledge arises because of the need to overcome doubt and conflict (Streit) – in other words, a discipline such as Dialectics is required precisely because of the existence of divergence; so that their demand is the greater the greater the controversy. Now, the doctrine of art should not establish a specific method to resolve this or that conflict in particular, but it needs to establish only the principles in their universality, in order to foster unity in the context of split thinking, since its purpose is to overcome of differences in the realm of pure thinking. However, dialectical art does not arise only because of the conflicts of representations, but it also presupposes an original impulse towards knowledge, which Schleiermacher designates as wanting to know (Wissenswollen), or even love for knowledge (Wissensliebe). Taking advantage of the Platonic atmosphere that surrounds such a definition, the love of knowledge - Ulrich Barth indicates that this notion would be a critical reformulation of the concept of idea taken from Plato's Symposium, that is, philosophy has the “task of leading to the concept that praxis”. of pre-reflective knowledge”; Furthermore, Barth emphasizes the fact that Dialectics, as a doctrine of art, intended to face the hypertrophy of the philosophical formation of systems of reason in the modern age - it consists, on the one hand, of a pre-scientific dimension responsible for the promotion of knowledge, but , on the other hand, the love of knowledge accentuates the incompleteness of knowledge, which is why dialectical art is lacking. In this particular, arguing against systems of philosophy that claim an unconditioned or absolute principle as a starting point, Schleiermacher asserts that there is no free starting point from (or prior to) the state of conflict. Not even wanting to know is an initial starting point, since we are always under its influence and, moreover, wanting to know does not determine the content of knowledge, but only instigates the spirit towards self-knowledge. Considering the general understanding of the art of dialogue analyzed so far, we can draw at least three general conclusions about the philosophical project that is inherent to it. In the first place, if Schleiermacher is linked to the Kantian transcendental discussion, he seeks to overcome, however, the pejorative sense of Dialectics as the logic of appearances. The Kantian Transcendental Dialectic implied a restrictive use of the concepts of pure reason (God, soul and world), as regulative principles that say nothing about the content of knowledge, but only about the formal conditions of agreement with the intellect, in such a way that they would not expand or would extend knowledge. However, Schleiermacher revalues ​​Dialectics as the philosophical art par excellence, since it, although not disconnected from the real sciences, exposes the principles and the system of knowledge. Second, the centrality of the concept of philosophical art, for the sphere of pure thinking, instead of the concept of philosophical science, reveals the anti-speculative background thesis of a knowledge that is permanently in the process of becoming. Philosophical art seeks the realization of real knowledge, but not the realization of knowledge about the Absolute. Rigorously considered, theoretical philosophy would only be fully realized, as a science, at the end of its journey and at the moment of the completion of all knowledge. In this particular, the desideratum of a reciprocal approximation between art and science, indicates Schleiermacher's agreement with F. Schlegel's romantic project of a Symphilosophie, namely: the thesis that art and science should converge, but only at the end, and whose task would be that of an infinite approximation.

But this project is also undoubtedly connected with Schelling, because Schleiermacher defends an original foundation (Urgrung) as a point of indifference between the ideal and real elements, even if this knowledge goes beyond the objective possibility of philosophizing, if there is the intention to extend it beyond the limits of pure or transcendental thinking. Thirdly and lastly, even if we were to take the argument that Schleiermacher's philosophical project remained fundamentally romantic, it would need to be nuanced - precisely because our author takes an intermediate position: a position that brings together, simultaneously, arguments defended by both Schlegel and by Shelling. Furthermore, one cannot ignore his unique reading and appropriation of Plato. And, moreover, It has also been argued that Schleiermacher would be one step between Kant and the speculative idealist system, insofar as he restricts, on the one hand, speculative reason (like Kant); but, on the other hand, it would seek to overcome (like idealism in general) the Kantian dualist solution to the antinomies in the speculative use of reason. Now, if the study of the commonalities and divergences between the philosophers of the German classical period, offers us opportunities to clarify, respectively, the philosophical projects of each exponent of the period. Nor should we reduce them to one another, a tactic that does little to contribute to a deeper understanding of the problems at hand. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to recognize the original and proper philosophical development of Schleiermacher, whose permanent debt to the Frühromantik movement may well conceal his mature philosophical production; production that even continued to be constantly corrected and expanded with each new exhibition of Dialectics. Finally, with regard to the question whether Schleiermacherian philosophy led, within idealism, to a post-idealist thought, or whether it is a model of systematized romanticism, we should pay attention to the following hermeneutical problem: regardless of the answer to this question, it seems to us that the underlying assumption is that Schleiermacher did not enjoy consistent thinking in his own right. Or he, being a (modest) idealist, paved the way for post-idealist philosophies; or he developed and organized the preceding romantic insights, because they were too aphoristic, but whose spiritual leadership belonged especially to F. Schlegel. In fact, whatever the solution found, we are left with the impression that its philosophical place was extemporaneous: since it belongs either to a romantic past (which is already gone), or to a post-idealist future (which is yet to come). But we should ask ourselves the following question: do we really have only these two possible ways to solve this problem of interpretation? The answer to this question obviously conditions Schleiermacher's place in the whole of classical German philosophy. (See the full article in Davison Schaeffer de Oliveira, e-ISSN: 2448-2137).