êthos mystéthikos - Chapter 18 (From the work in progress: The Poetized Critique) By M. Santos

 

18. ARTICULATIONS OF ACCESS TO THE IDEA OF HUMANITY (2): 

IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE IN AESTHETICS AND ETHICS

With regard to immediate knowledge in aesthetics and ethics, or rather, about mystéthiko knowledge, we must emphasize that the Kantian duplicity of worlds, which allows the co-existence of transcendental freedom with empirical necessity, can only be accepted as an a posteriori to the dialogical-dialectical-epistemic procedure.

As can be seen, we will no longer be concerned with an old, sometimes radical, sometimes irreconcilable distinction between ethics and aesthetics. However, taking the attitude as a universal element common to both 'sciences', in our way of thinking, it was up to the metaphysics of the beautiful to make aesthetics stand out in importance and scope, since sensation, even when taken empirically remains immovable and transcendental to any logic, from the most innocuous for such a philosophical enterprise, in this case, the one that underlies rationalism and empiricism, to the most appropriate, in this case, that of the 'original irrationalism' of the natural dynamics of the body, assumed here, in fact, as the object par excellence of both, in the sense of being the most appropriate for an approximation such as we intend in mysthesis.

Now, we will open a brief parenthesis, just to justify why mysthesis cannot be reduced to the prevailing logic model, both in rationalism and empiricism.

It is known that rationalism as an epistemological position can be characterized by the acceptance of at least one of the following three theses: 1. Reason and intuition must have privilege over sensation and experience in obtaining knowledge; 2. All or most ideas are innate rather than acquired in the course of life; and 3. The certainty of knowledge must be privileged over the mere probability of it, especially in philosophical investigations.

That said, it should be noted that mystéthiko knowledge departs from rationalist logic, since it dispenses with the 'privileges' of the principle of reason, in favor of pure mystéthika intuition, although I agree that ideas are mainly innate rather than acquired in the course of time. of life.

However, the term innate, here, must be sustained as what is subject to meditative reminiscence, therefore, in what precedes the physical body itself, that is, in what does not begin with the emergence of biological life.

Finally, the indefectible accuracy of mystéthiko knowledge is due to the indefectibility of the Idea of ​​Humanity that sustains it, and not simply in the proofs of mathematics and scientific evidence, for example.

As for the acceptance of the reality of substance as the fundamental principle of the unity of things, and what rationalism has affirmed, it means: that everything that exists has an intelligible cause, even if that cause cannot be demonstrated empirically, as the cause of the origin of the Universe; mysthesis, however, proposes the Consciousness of Humanity as a self-evident axiom, just as the Idea of ​​Humanity itself is self-evident.

In this way, mystéthika does not merely identify the rational with the real, assumed in the latter's total intelligibility and rationality. In other words, mystéthiko realism presents itself as a type of unrealism, that is, the totality of three-dimensional reality and even the four-dimensional reality of causality is nothing more than an illusory simulacrum, when confronted with the fifth-dimensionality of the Consciousness of the Idea of ​​Humanity.

Therefore, mysthesis is not based on the principle of the search for certainty through demonstration and analysis, supported, according to Kant, by a priori knowledge, that is, knowledge that is not innate nor does it arise from sensible experience, but which is produced only by reason. .

Even from the teleological point of view of ordinary morality, the misthesis proposes itself to the works of love, in the name of the collective interest (that is, it is sustained as a kind of unrealism, as these are extremely rare facts). But not in the utilitarian and restrictive sense of the English commonwealth, the basis of Anglo-Saxon liberalism itself.

In this way, the works of creative geniuses are even at the base of the planning of economic and spatial organization, as well as in the projects of harmonious social expansion in general, they are and are according to what has been presented about mystéthika so far.

Now, returning to the heart of this chapter, let us consider that complete freedom from necessity means the suspension of the use of sufficient reason. Therefore, the freedom of vital energy means neither more nor less than existing for its own sake. However, such energy is understood as a self-evident fact and not merely dependent on the emergence of biological organisms, but rather, being the conditioning fact of biological life itself.

In our way of thinking, moving freedom from action to human being, Schopenhauer converted the Kantian self-legislating will into a self-subsistent will, and moral autonomy into existential self-sufficiency. In this way, only a being who is the work of himself can be freely and fully responsible for his actions. Since action follows from being, therefore, the responsibility for acting will fall exclusively on the author of being. With this, the existence of a creator God, far from being a postulate of moral praxis, started to define only a case incompatible with human morality itself. And religion not only became incapable of making ethics possible, but, rather, it became synonymous with that which obstructs the human being's path to freedom.

Thus Schopenhauer claimed to have reconciled freedom with the principle of reason, through a Kantian duplicity of worlds that allows the co-existence of transcendental freedom with empirical necessity.

Now, this Kantian duplicity of worlds that allows the co-existence of transcendental freedom with empirical necessity is the key, for those who want to understand the rudiments of mysthesis, once the metaphysics of the beautiful is assumed as the climax of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

That is, in the mystéthika transcendental freedom and empirical necessity would only be reconciled, if both were maintained in the suspension of all chronology, something implicit with regard to the dialogical-dialectical-epistemic procedure of the works of love.

Going deeper into this sense of the metaphysics of the beautiful as something decisive to our articulations of access to the Idea of ​​Humanity, we will talk a little about Michelangelo Merisi di Caravaggio. He was born in Milan, on the 29th of September, 1571, and died in the Porto Ercole region, commune of Monte Argentario, on the 18th of July, 1610; and he was an Italian painter active in Rome, Naples, Malta and Sicily, between the years 1593 and 1610. His father, Fermo Merisi, was administrator and architect-decorator to the Marquis de Caravaggio.

He appeared on the Roman art scene in 1600, and since then he has never been short of commissions and patrons. Michelangelo Merisi, however, handled his success atrociously. He was an enigmatic, fascinating and dangerous man.

An early published note thus described Caravaggio's way of life: after a fortnight of work, he will wander for a month or two with a sword at his side and a servant following him from one ballroom to another, always ready to engage in any fight or quarrel, in such a way that it is rather awkward to accompany him. (in Floris Claes van Dijk; Rome, 1601).

In 1606, Caravaggio killed a young man during a fight and then fled Rome with a price on his head. In Malta (1608) he was involved in another fight, and another later, in Naples (1609), possibly an attempt, something premeditated on his life, by unidentified enemies. The following year, after an artistic career of little more than a decade, he was dead at the age of 38.

We are dealing with the life of Michelangelo Merisi because the works of art are being focused here through the prism of their relationship with ethics, so it seemed important to us to make a brief reflection on works of art that deal with barbarism. Therefore, we will take as an example some works by Caravaggio, and later by Rubens as well.

There is a work in which Caravaggio portrays the beheading of a tyrant by Judith, in which it seems clear to us that even barbarism is assumed by the aesthetic genius only from the point of view of beauty, because on the canvas we can clearly see a purely aesthetic approach to conduct human, even in the case of murderous behavior.

At this point, we can understand the attitudes of Caravaggio's life as coming from a type of ethics of a superior character, or at least indifferent and disinterested with regard to the character of the mere normative social conventions of the prevailing tradition in general.

Even Caravaggio's own murderous attitudes, as well as the senselessness of his violent impulses in society, must not be taken as some complete impediment to the reach of the works of love.

In short, mysthetically speaking, the flaws in the artist's personal character would invalidate him as a sage along the lines of morality in general. But the truth that his work contains has the disinterested power of creative genius, so the power of works of love works implicitly in them too, and that is enough, because it allows us to glimpse freedom based on the most refined aesthetic intuition. and that determines the negation of Negativity in life.

In this sense, in the relevant art, even the most terrible crime, however unjustified its practice may be, is seen in such a way as to consider only the Beautiful, and with the aim of ‘talking’ about the idea of ​​revenge or violence, for example.

Now, all ideas are indispensable, because the set of them can provide us with at least a relevant glimpse of what we call the Idea of ​​Humanity.

Other paintings that also express this same artistic nature are, for example: David with the head of Goliath and that of the beheading of Saint John the Baptist. However, in the Massacre of the Innocents, which is a famous and important oil on wood, by the baroque artist Peter Paul Rubens, dated 1636-1638, the minute details and minute details are contemplated by Rubens, as he does in most of his paintings. . This remarkable work compiles a very evident theme throughout Rubens' artistic journey, Religion. Biblical scenes like this were portrayed in detail by the greatest creator of Rococo, without the slightest lack of imagination and creativity, without repeating anything. These are true masterpieces, full of both history and monumental consideration.

The Massacre of the Innocents depicts the terrible massacre reported by St. Matthew in the Gospels, and is one of Rubens' later masterpieces. The action unfolds between three distinct groups, and a mystical central figure, with no defined group. Soldiers possessed by rage and relentless ruthlessness take over a temple, where believers fight for their lives, filled with terror and despair. Characters with algeria watch sadly as the entire battle unfolds.

Finally, works by Caravaggio, such as Judite and Holofernes, among others, for example, the beheading of Goliath and Saint John the Baptist; these three related to raw atrocity and violence. Or, from another perspective, Michelangelo's David, a much softer sculpture and without any allusion to the bloodthirsty king who was David, all represent the result of aesthetic intuition, the vision of the cosmic eye, which is essential for every great human being of genius. , whether he is a painter, poet, sculptor, musician, etc. Whether it portrays barbarism, the black plague or simple nudity. And as we have already said; the artist's moral flaws will in no way disable him from this freedom that the mystic gaze contains.

However, it should be noted here that mystéthika does not suggest a type of free-for-all such as Denial of negativity in life, it only implies that, in the Idea of ​​Humanity, the suspension of all chronology, therefore of all suffering, is something inseparable.

Now, being able to adopt the mystéthiko look and decide to practice the works of love is not a matter of being a person with a history of unblemished morals and irreproachable character in the face of the society of individualism as a general rule.

After we treat a little of these works and their respective artists, as important examples for our purpose, we must not, however, neglect that any religious prejudice should be left out, since what should stand out here is our effort in demonstrate the mystéthika of the creative genius's gaze on human behavior, because one cannot reach the essence of things, starting only from outside them, and the final result of our mystetic investigations should, in the end, provide us with only what concerns to the Idea of ​​Humanity.

All this significantly supports the investigation of human behavior as we are proposing here, highlighting the perspective of aesthetic intuition and writing without neglecting to propose nothing more than the dialogical-dialectic-epistemic, in which the insertion of the neologisms mystéthika and metaquantic is done well enough. justified, and so that will be useful to us in the future, when we wish to deal exclusively with mystéthika and, with it, place ourselves in the fifth-dimensional realm of metaquantum itself.

Now, let us remember that the fundamental theory that supported the structuring of this spectacularly bold starting point of ours was that: immediate knowledge is the same in aesthetics and ethics, since all knowledge in general, whether simply intuitive or merely empirical, both originate originally from Cosmic Energy, and belong to the essence of the highest as well as the lowest degrees of its objectification as well, that is, as mere mekanê and a means for the conservation of the individual and the species, as well as of any other organ of the human being. human body and indeed any other possible body type.

Therefore, originally in the service of Cosmic Energy and for the realization of its 'ends', causal knowledge will always remain in servitude to wild desires in all animals, and in almost all human beings as well. Thus, the works of love are not effectively carried out in the world.

However, knowledge, in some human beings, escapes this servitude and emancipates itself from every yoke of individualism, being able to subsist by itself, free from all the ends of wanting and as a limpid mirror of the Natural Energy, from which it proceeds. every work, especially that of creative geniuses, in which, finally, through this same mode of interactive knowledge with Cosmic Energy, the self-overcoming of chronology and closure in Cartesian-based dimensionality occurs.

That is, initially, resignation in the face of Negativity in life, then, its complete denial is the decisive 'target'. Then the inner essence of all virtue and wisdom opens up in the very 'redemption' of the world.

When dealing with this mystéthika reminiscence, we will have an understanding of this tendency to unite aesthetics with ethics, which appeared to us tacitly in the metaphysics of the beautiful, precisely when, from there, an absolute analogy between the aesthetic foundation and the ethical foundation was proposed; contrasting on the one hand the 'beautiful' and the pleasurable, correlatively with how the 'good' and the 'pleasurable' had been opposed, on the other hand, since Kant's philosophy in its own internal entanglement, and all this in an attempt to constitute a unit of analysis.

But if we exclude any possible hedonism in the field of aesthetics and ethics, then we will see that Kant has re-established the necessary link between aesthetics and ethics that seemed absolutely denied by his definition of the a-practicality of aesthetic contemplation, something to which Pareyson also clearly stressed, in his study of Kant, at the beginning of L'estetica dell'idealismo tedesco.

Therefore, mystetically speaking, we foresee the harbinger of the return of the metaphysics of ethics to aesthetics (metaphysics of the beautiful), this as a 'transmutation' of the aesthetic principle as a principle itself, that is, becoming the principle that presides over the foundation of ethics as well. .

In short, the clear quality of feeling as well as willing and acting will itself require the qualification of taste, in the sense of understanding the property that determines its essence.

But, as categorical, taste had found its reason for being in its own identification with beauty, Vergnugen der blossen Empfindung, that is, in the 'pleasure of mere sensation', and that alone could not reject the work of art as a work of art. of love in painting, sculpture, architecture, even landscaping, and even more in poetry, finally in music.

So, we can reaffirm that the concepts of philosophy are really dead, because as long as we seek to only interpret the world and explain its essence, we will have nothing of the thing itself. However, musical language already introduces us to the highest epistemic in the world, since it is purely intuitive.

In short, and using a Pythagorean metaphor, we say that there is a geometry even in the hum (frequency, resonance, vibration) of the strings, which is music in the space of spheres.

Let us note here how the relationship between aesthetics and ethics is intertwined. And, let us also consider that the characteristics that free things reveal palely and imperfectly, can undergo modifications that elevate the mode of consideration, until one assumes the genius of ideas in these very characteristics, that is, to the limit of perfection. . This is why genius sees everything above any common measure, and everywhere sees the extreme. Precisely for this reason, his behavior tends to go to extremes, because he doesn't get it right and he usually lacks that normotic placidity in his actions.

That is to say, the actions of the great artistic and creative geniuses in general are almost always punctuated by extravagances that resemble madness. Our example of Caravaggio, quoted earlier, was intended to highlight something of this as well.

Therefore, the genius knows ideas perfectly, but not individuals, nor social and even causal relationships.

Thus, in the ordinary way of conduct, the creative genius differs from the common individual, who is more readily subject to the impositions of Negativity in life and, also, to the normative prescriptions of ethical-social institutions.

The sage, on the other hand, conducts himself in life so as not to increase the suffering of any creature. In this sense, their 'ascetic morality' also does not conform to the moral mode of the majority, that is, it is not generally accepted by the majority as ethical and correct. It is, rather, an aberration of nature, something as extravagant as the social inadequacies of a Caravaggio or an Amadeus Mozart, for example.

In order not to go so far in search of a clear example of the rejection suffered by the sage, it is enough for us to think about what the gospels describe about the life of Jesus of Nazareth. Now, let us not forget how easy it was to convince the people to decide to release Barabbas.

In this way, we see that, when we propose, in a concise and sufficiently clear way, a mysticized view of thought, something that fully includes that articulation of the possibility of aesthetics as the foundation of ethics; the best thing to do at first, and what seemed to us didactically more viable, was not to stray too far from considerations about artistic genius and music as an expression of metaphysical reality.

Having said that, we can now understand that a mere moral philosophy, without an explanation of nature, as Socrates wanted to introduce, is analogous to a melody without harmony, which Rousseau wanted exclusively; on the other hand, a simple philosophy of nature, a mere physics and metaphysics without ethics, would correspond to a harmony without melody.

Even so, we must reinforce that in mysthesis the step of returning from the metaphysics of ethics to aesthetics (metaphysics of the beautiful) has already taken place, through the dialogical-dialectical-epistemic procedure. Even because, the being of the total nature and of the world is action and overcoming, both characterized in the matter, in whose base rests the Cosmic Energy imbricated in the Idea of ​​Humanity.

Therefore, mysthesis considers that the phenomenal world of science and the moral world of laws both succumb, before the ingenious way of conceiving and acting in the world. Such a mode is what produces works that propose ideas that are indelible in time, because breaking with all illusion presupposes aesthetically intuiting freedom in the Idea, even if fleetingly.

In this sense, the ontic freedom of the human being will always demand what precedes it and determines it entirely in its most spontaneous action, that is, the mystéthika, implied at the basis of every creative attitude, therefore, the basis for the freedom of humanity as a whole. , realized only in compassionate works.

In this sense, being, power and doing are closely related, for the purpose of an understanding that encompasses the notions proposed in the metaphysics of ethics. And it is worth noting that the freedom of aesthetic enjoyment is the same freedom of sapiential contemplation, when considered in the time of Energy, the nunc stans. Therefore, being, power and doing become immediate in the sphere of the Idea of ​​Humanity.

Now, notice here that, even though it is fifth-dimensional, such an Idea never departs from fourth-dimensional humanity because, if it were, the works of love would never be materialized, and even compassion would subsist only as an indispensable mystery for good living. Furthermore, the way of negating Negativity in life would always be inept and frustrating.

To further clarify these articulations on the union of aesthetics and ethics, it is also important to emphasize that ethics is the science that seeks to investigate and show the unalterable meaning of good action, regardless of time and space; and aesthetics is the science that seeks to investigate the subjective and objective conditions that underlie judgment and intuition about the Beautiful. But, please note, that metaphysics of the beautiful is not simply standard philosophical aesthetics, because even aesthetically we know that it is reason that holds the ability to propose judgments.

In the case of aesthetics, we can think of judgments about taste, judgments of beauty. In ethics, judgments are normative and legalistic by example. Therefore, even through judgments, ethics and aesthetics are related too, whenever we declare the beauty of a thing by judging aesthetically, and the goodness of an attitude, judging ethically.

However, it was not on this basis at all that we made the step back from the metaphysics of ethics to the metaphysics of the beautiful.

When we propose the aesthetic possibility of the metaphysics of ethics, starting fundamentally from the metaphysics of the beautiful, this is the same as being able to assume praxis from the point of view of beauty. Therefore, we could not fail to highlight that deep knowledge of Platonic philosophy, which, in its own way, awakened us to the importance of ideas to the detriment of any type of exaltation of simulacra.

Finally, as our aim was to clarify this very subtle point of mysthesis, then, it does not hurt to remember that Plato is the main philosopher in Schopenhauer's opinion. Kant is the second.

Now, the problem at this point is that mystéthika does not simply unfold from the logic of aesthetic and ethical judgments, since every proposition is logically elaborated, but mysthesis always refers to the original foundation of pure imagination and sensation, which is a kind of 'irrational', at least in the world of analytics and technology.

As the understanding is the faculty of judgments, always involved in the game of elaboration of judgments, which, in being in good taste, judge the aesthetic and the beautiful, and, in the case of good action, judge the ethical and moral. So, the function of mystéthika is not to judge, because it is not knowledge tied to the old ‘logical square’.

Finally, it will be up to mysthesis to mystethize, in order to prepare human consciousness in general for the entrance of metaquantic as a type of ideal science.

Therefore, it remains for us to say, albeit provisionally, that mystéthika is poetically out of balance and from the imagination, that is, it proposes the need to 'un-read' and to resize the meaning of the world in its own chronology, as it is never tied to the merely use analytic of reason. Even because, mystéthika presupposes, at least, that we add intuition (pineal) and feeling (heart), combining them synergistically with instrumental reason (brain).

Now, the unfolding of this uncertainty and this non-locality is not a dystopia, like that of the 'paradise of religions', on the contrary, it is even realized and given in the set of all the works of creative geniuses in this world, and this will not culminate in another resulting from genuine philosophizing if not mystethizing, which will make us jump from mere metaphysics, traditionally conventional, and enter the multi-universal sphere of the Idea of ​​Humanity, through the dialogical-dialectical-epistemic procedure.

But we will discuss this better later, in an exclusive work on fifth-dimensional metaquantum.

Now, when we read Plato's Symposium, we saw that Pausanias, speaking, revealed to his listeners something very important to be considered here, and to help us understand what we are proposing as a fusion of aesthetics with ethics.

Pausanias said: All actions, in fact, are not in themselves, in their pure accomplishment, neither good nor bad; and serve as an example what we are now engaged in doing: drinking, singing, or talking. None of this taken in an absolute way is beautiful – but it depends on the way in which this activity is actualized so that it becomes such. Beautiful is right and good action; ugly is the wrong (bad) action.

Thus, we undeniably have the sensitivity again in that playful game with reason, to which both ethics and aesthetics, and even hard science, resort. And, especially in the latter case, it is important for us to consider future metaquantics as the science that will never lose sight of the anteriority and the natural imposition of sensitivity on reason, something similar to what Hume already warned us in his famous Treatise on Human nature.

Kant asked about the nature and mode of possibility of the judgment of taste, about what happens when a thing is said to be or is not beautiful. He was dissatisfied with the attempts at an answer presented so far, from the genesis of the Enlightenment to the emergence of empiricist authors such as the Londoner Shaftesbury (1671-1713).

For Kant, a judgment of this type must fulfill certain requirements such as: being universal, being disinterested and not providing empirical knowledge. Therefore, unlike what the Critique of Judgment (1790) deals with, where it was intended to unfold the limits of the aesthetic discipline, the metaphysics of the beautiful is much more than a mere theory of art. However, such metaphysics still took care of philosophically describing the essence of beauty and what happens when the artist is affected by the feeling of Beauty, something to which mystéthika will never go back, even though it has assumed the metaphysics of the beautiful as a superior starting point than metaphysics of the beautiful.

At this point, let us consider this important fragment, and this perhaps sheds light on something more and better in these articulations. It alludes to L. Wittgenstein (1889-1951), a thinker deeply influenced by Schopenhauer, if we admit that the first Wittgenstein inherited from Schopenhauer the radical dissociation between the field of logical representation of the world and the dimension of human will.

Wittgenstein said: That the sun rises tomorrow is a hypothesis, and that means: we don't know if it will really rise.

From this conception, we see that the act of will and the accomplishment of what is desired come to be regarded as two entirely different occurrences. In this sense, the relationship between the will and what happens in the world can only be accidental.

Therefore, based on the principle of reason, the human being cannot make anything happen by himself, not even a simple movement of his body.

On the other hand, insofar as, according to the theory of figuration, both a proposition and its negation are both possible, then a proposition held to be true is also something merely accidental. From all this Wittgenstein drew the conclusion that there can be no propositions in ethics. By this he meant that if something has value, it cannot be merely accidental, that is, the thing must have value in itself.

In the world, however, everything is accidental, consequently, in it, there can be no value. In other words, ‘in the world everything is as it is and happens as it happens: in it there is no value, and if there were, then the value itself would have no value’.

Finally, we can admit that the misthesis considers that something of value in itself belongs only to the Consciousness of Humanity in the Idea of Humanity. Therefore, there can only be value in itself when the timeline is mystethized, that is, assimilated by the metaquantum sphere of fifth-dimensionality in the aionic now.

Therefore, if there is a value that has value in itself, it must remain outside all events, for all events are accidental. In other words, the meaning of the world must be outside of it, which is what makes it non-accidental value.

Therefore, the real value cannot be in the world, otherwise it would again be accidental. This conception does not constitute an absolute denial of the existence of value, but of the existence of value in the world of causality.

In this way, mystetically, we are affirming then, that the value itself belongs to the scope of the Idea of ​​Humanity. In other words, the four-dimensionality of the world precludes any possibility for value to enter it, because value itself demands that something unlimited that only five-dimensionality can guarantee.

Since propositions speak only about what is in the world, then everything that concerns ethics cannot be expressed by propositions, for these, Wittgenstein further said, 'can not express anything else' and he added further : 'it is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental.

Thus, the world and what is in it is neither good nor bad, because Good and Evil exist only in relation to the subject and the subject is also conceived by Wittgenstein as being transcendental, since 'the subject does not belong to the world, but is a limit of the world'.

Finally, for Wittgenstein, in his 1732 treatise, Characteristics of Men, Customs, Opinions, and Times, ‘the intuition of the world sub specie aeternitatis is the intuition of it as a limited whole’. For him, this intuition is mystical in nature; further, he asserts that 'what is mystical is not how the world is, but let it be'. Let it be mystéthiko then!

To better visualize what is meant here, let us also consider that moral sentimentality was also a mark of the British current of thought in the 18th century, that is, there was the belief that human beings have a moral and aesthetic nature whose organ is the feeling (heart), something that already appeared in Shaftesbury and that was common to the whole of embryonic empiricist thought.

Therefore, the existence of a moral and aesthetic sense does not imply that ethical and aesthetic principles are not universal and absolute, and that these must be educated by reason.

This recognition of the independence of feeling from reason is found in all spheres of eighteenth-century British thought. Even Shaftesbury understood that the human being has a sensitive capacity that makes him feel pleasure in his aesthetic communication with the world. He said, also a Neoplatonist: 'All beauty is true'. And this seems to us to be a classic principle, in which the immediate and the cognitive character in the experience of beauty are simultaneously recognized.

Now, the intelligible character is the essential and most proper nature of the human being, and what can be understood as a determinant of every phenomenon. Still, the feeling is present in all aspects of human life, and not only in the social, but. At the same time, feeling is autonomous and has its own law. This idea is the same, expressed in the Treatise on Human Nature, when David Hume even goes so far as to suggest that reason is the slave of the passions. As he himself rightly pointed out, reason is, and should only be, the slave of the passions.

Therefore, the value of feeling also accompanies the revaluation of sensible knowledge and the place of both in the empiricist theory of knowledge. Thus, Hume understood that no reasoning can be valid by itself, that is, without recourse to experience, and more, if the understanding acted by itself, and in accordance with its most general principles, it would soon destroy itself completely and would not leave even the tiniest degree of evidence, in no proposition be of the most cultured philosophy or even of common sense.

It is in this context that we must understand his assertion of the primacy of the passions over reason, because, in the first place, the passions have their own rules, those of feeling and imagination, etc. And it is not just that they are autonomous, but, moreover, reason needs them, without which pure rational autonomy could not be valid, neither to philosophy nor to ordinary life.

Even with regard to the aesthetic experience of the world, if beauty is not a transcendental or innate idea, neither does there seem to be, among the impressions of the senses and even in reason, something that corresponds to it.

We say of beauty that it causes a pleasurable feeling, something that we believe to be caused by the Beautiful, but none of our external senses directly apprehend any property of what is called the Beautiful. At this point, mysthetics is tempted to dilute the very notion of transcendence into metaquantum fifth-dimensionality.

Therefore, we can understand that there are different approaches to this theme, from the more objectivist ones (such as Hutcheson's) to the more subjectivist ones (such as Hume's), but, in any case, they all rest on the idea that the experience of beauty is immediately, as well as in the activity of the imagination, where our natural capacity for the recognition of the Beautiful resides.

Now, mystically speaking, on this basis, the imagination is considered as the dynamo that drives the common human being, the prisoner of the scientific way of approaching the world.

But for the genius way of knowing, however, and as we have already observed, it is very common to be guided by imagination, both in the aesthetic intuition of the world and in the attitude free from Negativity in life.

Thus, when trying to imagine the pain of the other, we find the possibility of compassion, that is, of suffering like the other. On this would be based a 'moral' exempt from rational imperatives, as it is linked to feeling alone, in a clear and unequivocal empathy that it is not good to increase our suffering or that of any other being.

Ending this section, it is essential to emphasize that the possibility of human freedom, whether in the metaphysics of beauty or in the metaphysics of ethics, will always result from overcoming suffering. Even because, from the point of view of nature, life is immortal and inexhaustible, therefore, whoever individualizes it suffers, but itself, as Cosmic Energy and in an impersonal sense, suffers nothing.

Only in this way can there truly be a sense of real understanding of the notion of freedom so far. That is, knowledge whose usual expression in Sanskrit is the formula 'tat-vam asi', meaning 'you are this', is what appears as compassion; on which, therefore, all authentic, that is, disinterested, virtue is based, and whose real expression is every good deed.

It is, in the last term, to this knowledge that all appeal and mercy are directed, to charity, to mercy instead of justice; for such an appeal is a reminder of the consideration that we are all one and the same Being-Idea of ​​Humanity.